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Abstract 
The study reported in this article explored the nexus between military theory 
and history. Military theory attempts to quantify, qualify and illuminate the often 
unpredictable phenomenon of war. The article consists of two parts: the theory of 
manoeuvre warfare and the history of the 1914-1915 South African campaign in 
German South West Africa (GSWA). The GSWA campaign has been described in 
many ways as a secondary theatre within the greater geostrategic chess game of the 
First World War. The objective of this analysis was to question whether the South 
African victory resulted from vast numerical superiority or from the operational 
concepts, which the South Africans applied in the execution of the campaign. 
Introduction 
At the outbreak of the First World War, the then Union of South Africa found 
itself in an uncertain political situation. The Union was formed in 1910 and was still 
in the process of reconciliation following the South African War (1899–1902). There 
was strong anti-British sentiment within the Union with a large number of Afrikaners 
wanting complete independence from the Crown.  
The 1914-1915 campaign in GSWA was an integral part of the British 
international strategy during the Great War (1914–1918). South Africa found itself 
fighting on the side of the British despite still nursing wounds of the South African 
War. The leadership of Louis Botha (prime minister) and Jan Smuts (Minister of 
Defence) motivated the invasion of GSWA as necessary in the defence of the Union 
of South Africa. The Defence Act of 1912 
stipulated that members of the Union 
Defence Force (UDF) could render defence 
in protection of the Union of South Africa.2 
Botha’s parliamentary motion for the 
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invasion of GSWA was passed on 10 September 1914, 91 votes to ten.3  
The commandos formed a large part of the UDF. They were independent in 
thought and impatient of any formal means of control. The commandos were astute, 
and they relied on their tactical sense and their rifle as a means of offence.4 The 
development of the horse and the rifle in conjunction is part of the commando 
tradition. The result of this system was a soldier who could deliver accurate and 
economical fire and who could cross almost any kind of terrain.5 It is possible that 
certain military characteristics of the commandos were well suited for the execution 
of manoeuvre warfare. 
Manoeuvre warfare theory is a military theory that proposes the defeat rather 
than the complete destruction of the enemy through attrition.6 This theory contrasts 
from the belief in superiority in numbers, which is of fundamental importance to the 
attrition theorist. David Killingray argues that numerical superiority was a crucial 
aspect in the defeat of the Germans in GSWA.7 Byron Farwell is of the opinion that 
the Germans were outmatched given the disparity in numbers.8 Thomas Ungleich 
describes the campaign in the most recent pro-German account and argues that the 
South African numerical superiority was the main cause of victory.9 Jan Smuts 
junior, the son of General Smuts, writes that in the campaign in GSWA, “the victory 
was due to superior tactics as well as overwhelming strength”.10  
Brigadier General JJ Collyer puts the strength of the UDF at 50 000 
compared to the modest 7 000 German soldiers whom Gerald L’ange estimates at a 
more humble 2 000 German soldiers with 4 000 reservists and 480 policemen 
capable of rendering military service.11 Collyer writes about the military advantages 
enjoyed by the Germans over the South Africans, which included an undivided 
command, a conventionally trained homogeneous force, superior artillery and good 
logistics, which included a well-structured rail system.12 Deneys Reitz identified 
similar advantages, but also included the difficult terrain, which made the provision 
of logistics extremely difficult for the UDF.13  
At a superficial glance, the numerical difference in the size of the forces 
could lead to the misperception that the campaign was relatively easy for the UDF. 
This was not necessarily the case. Each UDF advance would take the logistical 
system to breaking point and would require an operational pause to recuperate.  
This article reports on an analysis of manoeuvre warfare theory in the 1914 
South African campaign in GSWA to determine whether the cause of victory could 
be attributed to the superiority in numbers of the UDF or rather to the application of 
operational concepts congruent to manoeuvre warfare theory. 
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The German defeat was analysed through using applicable parts of the 
theories of EA Cohen and J Gooch14 as well as that of MI Handel.15 These authors 
explored the cause of defeat relative to organisational factors as well as tangible and 
intangible aspects, which influence the outcome of battles and campaigns.  
Gooch and Cohen created a methodology for defeat, which requires one to 
determine the cause of the military failure (from the German perspective), which is 
followed by determining the critical lapses or tasks that were left undone and which 
led to the defeat. The third step was to do a layered analysis, which included some 
of the organisational aspects which led to failure.16 This analysis was used by Ian 
van der Waag in his seminal piece on the Battle of Sandfontein,17 and the present 
study thus built on the central tenets of his thesis.  
Handel identifies a formula to determine total military power (refer to Figure 
1). This equation was used in the analysis of the campaign in GSWA when 
comparing the UDF and the German force. The quantitative elements are the 
numbers of soldiers and equipment. ‘Materiel quality’ refers to whether the 
equipment used by a given military was of a good standard and ‘non-materiel 
quality’ refers to the intangibles of military forces, such as morale, motivation, level 
of training, doctrine, staff work and organisation.18 
Total military power = quantity x materiel quality x non-materiel quality 
Figure 1. Formula for total military power.19 
Manoeuvre warfare theory 
Manoeuvre theory comprises the basic idea of defeating your enemy through 
the least amount of effort and with attaining the least loss possible.20 Manoeuvre is 
regarded by many as the most important way of achieving victory in conflict.21 
Attrition and manoeuvre theories are prominent basic - yet opposite - military 
theories applied to conventional warfare. Both theories have the same aim, which is 
to attain victory in war, however they differ in method. The manoeuvre theory 
framework, which was applied in the present study, is derived largely from the works 
of Robert Leonhard, William Lind and Richard Simpkin.22 Manoeuvre warfare 
identifies three possible methods for attaining victory: pre-emption, dislocation and 
disruption.  
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Map 1: German South West Africa c. 1915.23 
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Pre-emption relies on movement over firepower and surprise as well as a 
rapid decision-making cycle.24 Simpkin argues that pre-emption makes use of 
manoeuvre to prevent the outbreak of combat.25 Further, pre-emption attacks the 
enemy’s plan in such a way that it denies the enemy freedom of action. In doing so, 
the initiative is taken from the enemy.26 Pre-emption is based on intuition more than 
intelligence.27  
Dislocation involves the removal of the enemy’s combat strength from the 
decisive point. This includes avoiding combat where the enemy is stronger and 
choosing how to position one’s forces so as to ensure the best results.28 Dislocation 
is based on good intelligence and makes use of surprise, deep penetrating advances 
and envelopment so as to dislocate the physical and psychological spheres of the 
enemy.29 
Disruption involves the destruction of assets of the enemy fighting 
capability, which paralyses the enemy force.30 This comprises the third means of 
achieving victory through manoeuvre warfare, and involves defeating the enemy by 
attacking their centre of gravity.31  
On the opposite side of the spectrum is attrition theory which, in contrast to 
manoeuvre theory, emphasises the breaking of the opponent’s will by destruction 
through the massing of forces and direct attack. Manoeuvre warfare, on the other 
hand, emphasises avoiding the “enemy’s strength in favour of attacking his 
weakness”.32 
Attrition theory focuses on the tactical level, and the central purpose is to 
bring the opposing force to a decisive battle through the concentration of forces. The 
use of superior firepower and technology is directly related to the employment of 
attrition theory.33 This theory is Clausewitzian by nature to the extent that it places 
the emphasis on the idea of the central battle. 
Manoeuvre warfare is linked to a rapid decision-making cycle, lower-level 
command initiative and a decentralised command system. Lind discusses the aspect 
of decentralisation of military forces, and comments that the decision-making cycle 
of a given military force must be done at a pace that is faster than that of the enemy 
and that this must be done by the respective decentralised forces.34 A rapid decision-
making cycle relates to the pre-emption and dislocation of the enemy. 
Sun Tzu’s famous quote is rephrased by Leonhard who claims, “the highest 
and purest application of manoeuvre theory is to pre-empt the enemy, disarm or 
neutralise him before the fight”.35 Tzu phrases this as, “supreme excellence is not to 
fight and conquer in all your battles but rather in breaking the enemy’s resistance 
without fighting”.36  
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Manoeuvre theory is essentially offensive in nature; however, it may occur 
that a defensive position may be taken to await supplies.37 Logistics is fundamental 
to warfare and determines the size of the force which can be deployed, how these 
forces are to be maintained in terms of rations, ammunition, fuel and other 
requirements. It further determines the flow and rhythm of operations.38 An 
operational pause must be taken at a time when the operation is no longer sustainable. 
Such pause along one line of operations should be met with the hastening of the 
tempo on another line of operations.39  
The levels of war, decision-making cycles and manoeuvre 
As a theory, manoeuvre warfare is flexible and extends itself over the 
strategic, operational and tactical levels of war.40 At tactical level, manoeuvre and 
attrition theories are interwoven where manoeuvre is translated into mobility and 
attrition into firepower.41 Furthermore, at tactical level, firepower provides the 
stability which manoeuvre in the form of mobility cannot provide.42  
The levels of war are intrinsically related to their respective centres of 
gravity. Clausewitz defines the centre of gravity as “the hub of all power and 
movement on which everything depends”.43 Manoeuvre warfare theory adapted the 
conceptual understanding of the term ‘centre of gravity’ to refer to the critical 
vulnerability which, if compromised, would lead to the paralysis of the enemy and 
not just a reduction of the enemy’s military capabilities.44 Through attacking the 
enemy’s centre of gravity, one should defeat the enemy. The centre of gravity can 
be at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war. At each level, the centres 
of gravity of war are related to the objective of that specific level.45  
Colonel John Boyd’s decision cycle represents the continuous process of 
observation, orientation, decision and action (OODA), and is thus referred to as the 
OODA loop.46 By completing this cycle before the enemy and disrupting the 
enemy’s OODA cycle, a given force gains the initiative. Boyd’s theory is largely 
psychological and deals with the will and morale of the fighting force.47 Only a 
decentralised military force allows for a fast OODA cycle.48 The commander’s intent 
forms the decision-making framework for the subordinate commanders whether at 
operational or tactical level.49 Some theorists maintain that command decisions have 
to be made at the tactical level for manoeuvre theory to be effective.50  
Sun Tzu refers to the military components necessary to execute manoeuvre 
warfare, which include “an ‘ordinary’ force that would pin the enemy and an 
‘extraordinary’ force that would perform a manoeuvre to outflank the enemy”.51 The 
ordinary force fixes the enemy and the extraordinary force strikes.52 Jomini states 
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that the chances of victory are far increased when there is a direct attack and a 
flanking manoeuvre.53  
Overview of the German South West African campaign 
The German forces adopted a defensive strategy and their commander at the 
time, Colonel Joachim von Heydebreck, made maximum use of the geography of 
GSWA as well as internal lines of communication to delay the UDF invasion and 
prevent their redeployment to other theatres of the Great War.54 Von Heydebreck 
was succeeded by Major Victor Franke who was subsequently promoted to the rank 
of lieutenant colonel.  
The Germans had at their disposal an advanced railway system for mobility 
and the natural obstacles of the desert and a lack of water resources so as to obstruct 
the invading force.55 Botha described GSWA as “a natural fortress”.56 The Germans 
placed the railway system strategically to transport troops from the coast to inland 
positions at a rapid pace. Furthermore, the railway system took into account the 
military consideration of massing troops at a rapid rate against the Ovambos in the 
north or against the Union in the south.57  
The Germans had the advantage of operating on interior lines, which enabled 
them to concentrate superior numbers within most of the colony during the advance 
of the South African forces.58 Despite having superior military numbers, the UDF 
was not able to advance with their entire force at any one time on the respective lines 
of operations. 
Over half of the UDF was comprised of highly mobile mounted soldiers and 
the other half was made up of infantry. The campaign also made use of aircraft for 
forward reconnaissance.59 Mobility was the key requirement for the planned 
movements of the campaign. The Union raised 33 308 mounted troops for the 
Afrikaner Rebellion and the GSWA campaign and 15 397 non-mounted troops.60  
The initial strategic plan for the invasion of GSWA included amphibious 
landings at Lüderitz and Walvis Bay. The force at Walvis Bay was to advance via 
the shortest distance to Windhoek. The strategic plan, as determined by Smuts, was 
stifled by the British War Office who determined that the naval vessels could only 
transport South African troops to Lüderitz. The invasion plan was thus changed and 
improvised to a less efficient one with which Smuts was not entirely satisfied.61 
The restructured invasion plan comprised the amphibious landings of the 
South African forces at Lüderitz and at Port Nolloth. The military force at Port 
Nolloth landed on 31 August 1914 and advanced across the Orange River into 
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GSWA via Raman’s Drift and Sandfontein. The amphibious landing at Lüderitz took 
place on 18 September 1914 and the port city was taken unopposed. Raman’s Drift 
was occupied on 14 September 1914. The wireless station at Swakopmund was also 
destroyed on 14 September 1914 by naval shelling.62 The first invasion resulted in 
the Battle of Sandfontein and the first operational loss for the UDF. 
 
 
Map 2. Terrain and infrastructure of GSWA.63 
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The second invasion effort involved the amphibious landings of South 
African forces at Walvis Bay (Northern Army) and the reinforcing of the forces at 
Lüderitz (Central Force, see Graph 1). The second invasion plan was similar to the 
original plan envisioned by Smuts. The second amphibious landing was executed, 
and Walvis Bay was taken unopposed on 25 December 1914. There were also two 
South African force groupings (Eastern and Southern Forces) deployed from across 
the Union and GSWA border in March 1915. Once the UDF had been deployed, a 
great obstacle to the campaign was that of the physical geography of GSWA, which 
influenced the logistical supply of the troops. 
Botha was in personal command of the northern operations, which 
comprised a two-prong easterly advance from Walvis Bay to Windhoek. The 
southern operations involved a north-easterly drive from the forces at Lüderitz and 
a northerly advance from the forces advancing through Namaqualand and the 
Kalahari Desert. The British war effort required control of the harbours and wireless 
stations in GSWA, which were referred to as “a great and urgent imperial service”.64 
The battle of Sandfontein, 26 September 1914 
The Union’s initial invasion of GSWA comprised two force groupings. 
Colonel (later Major General) Henry Lukin landed in Port Nolloth on 31 August 
1914 along with an artillery complement, five mounted regiments, the 
Witwatersrand Rifles, a section of engineers and an ammunition column.65 Lukin’s 
advance with ‘A’ force, the first of the Force groupings, was hindered by ‘B’ Force 
commander, Commandant Manie Maritz, who had defected (as he did not identify 
with British interests) and was from then on in collusion with the Germans.66 
Maritz was supposed to have supported Lukin in the cross-border advance. 
Collyer contends that even if everything had gone according to plan, the advance 
would have been risky but an advance of either force in isolation was akin to 
failure.67 Botha would later testify in the Rebellion Inquiry that, in terms of time and 
space, it was understood that Maritz would not have been able to have supported 
Lukin.68 This theme requires further investigation. 
The Germans knew that the South Africans had to advance along 
predetermined routes as the availability of water dictated.69 There was a German 
force advancing on Ramans Drift from the north whilst Lukin advanced on Ramans 
Drift from Steinkopf in the south. Lukin wanted to occupy the position before the 
arrival of the Germans.70 Lukin’s planned advance was to go through Ramans Drift, 
Warmbad, Kalkfontein and Seeheim.71 The main force of Lukin arrived at 
Ramansdrift on 24 September 1914.72 
99 
 
 
Map 3: Lines of communication.73 
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Lukin was reluctant to send his forces north of the Orange River without 
having the necessary supply lines in place. However, he was ordered by Defence 
Headquarters to advance and he thus sent Lieutenant Colonel RC Grant to move up 
to Sandfontein, which had the only water source en route to Warmbad. Defence 
Headquarters subsequently ordered supplies up to Sandfontein to facilitate the 
advance on Warmbad.74 By requesting Lukin to advance from the south, Defence 
Headquarters planned to take pressure off the force that had landed at Lüderitz.75  
Von Heydebreck was in command of the Schutztruppe in GSWA until his 
death in November 1914. He was well regarded as a competent commander with 
vast military experience and initiative. On the morning of 26 September 1914, the 
Germans converged on Sandfontein with four columns, which had been massed in 
secret on the unsuspecting South Africans. The Germans attacked from the north, 
south, east and west.76 The Germans started with an artillery bombardment, which 
commenced a little after Grant’s arrival at 07:25.77 Grant deployed his artillery at the 
base of the hill and the infantrymen formed a defensive line around the hill using 
rifle fire to keep the Germans at bay. The Germans bombarded the South African 
position extensively shelling their wagons, horses and mules as well as spraying 
shrapnel over the infantrymen.78 The German infantry and machine-gun sections 
surrounded the South African camp and bombarded the UDF from the northwest, 
northeast and southwest.79  
The Germans intensified their bombardment of Sandfontein and after ten 
hours of fighting, Grant raised the white flag. He realised that no military objective 
could be reached by further resistance as they were cut off, and the relief force had 
not managed to repel the Germans or spring them free. On inspecting the battlefield 
on 27 September 1914, Lukin was in agreement with Grant’s decision to surrender.80  
Many sources attribute the defeat at Sandfontein to the treachery of Maritz, 
as he did not advance to support the cross-border operations of Lukin.81 Collyer 
assigns a great deal of the blame to Defence Headquarters, which demanded the 
advance of Lukin’s force. Collyer raises the point that, regardless of whether Maritz 
supported Lukin or not, the Germans could have massed greater forces than the 
combined strength of Maritz and Lukin’s forces.82 Warwick places most of the blame 
on Smuts for the haste with which the Union advanced and for the placement of 
political objectives before the military considerations and realities.83 Van der Waag 
reevaluates the loss at Sandfontein looking at the battle from a strategic and 
organisational point of view bringing in a balanced approach to the complex study 
of military victories and defeats.84 
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Analysis of the Battle of Sandfontein with reference to manoeuvre warfare 
theory 
From a South African perspective, the Battle of Sandfontein demonstrated 
an example of static warfare, which is more inclined to attrition than manoeuvre 
warfare theory. The UDF column advanced to Sandfontein, which was an untenable 
defensive position, where they had to rely exclusively on firepower in response to 
the German attack.  
The Germans made excellent use of mobility. The German forces were 
operating on internal lines of communication whereas the South Africans were 
operating on external lines of communication. The German forces were numerically 
superior at the Battle of Sandfontein as they mobilised approximately 2 000 soldiers 
from different parts of GSWA while the South African forces numbered 
approximately 300.85 
The speed of the German advance robbed the Union of its military initiative 
and they were essentially reactive to a completely dominant German attack. The 
operation was characterised by inefficient South African intelligence and predictable 
military advances.86 Lukin justified his capture of Sandfontein in that he wanted to 
hold the only water supply in the area.87 
The Union’s advance had reached its culmination point at Sandfontein. The 
advance of Lukin’s entire force was extended from Sandfontein to Raman’s Drift, 
Houm’s Drift, Steinkopf and Port Nolloth.88 The Union force was advancing to no 
definable military operational objective while extending its logistical lines. Lukin 
was not able to support the forces deployed at Sandfontein effectively.89 At the 
tactical level, the water supply was an objective; however, it did not link up to an 
operational objective. Tactical objectives should link up to an operational objective. 
An advance on any given tactical and operational objectives should have sufficient 
logistics to keep the troops supplied and mobile. 
At strategic level, the Union required an advance into GSWA to show 
solidarity to the British war effort and the urgent imperial service. At operational 
level, there was no conceptualisation of a definable decisive point or objective, 
which theoretically should have led to the German centre of gravity. The operational 
advance was thus directed by a strategic consideration without realistic operational 
objectives and without sufficient logistical support.  
Following the initial invasion of GSWA and defeat at Sandfontein, the UDF 
was recalled to quell the internal threat of rebellion within the Union. After the Battle 
of Sandfontein and the Rebellion, the UDF was united under a unified leadership 
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structure. The subsequent invasion of GSWA followed four axes of advance, which 
resembled the initial strategic concept envisioned by Smuts.90 
The northern offensive 
The Union forces took Walvis Bay on 25 December 1914 without a shot 
fired in anger, and Swakopmund followed in January 1915. Colonel PCB Skinner 
led the initial invasion of Walvis Bay, which was unopposed by the Germans – 
excepting for sporadic skirmishing and some booby traps left behind.91 Botha, as 
Prime Minister of the Union, was appointed as Commander-in-Chief of the 
expeditionary force by special commission in terms of Section 81 of the Defence Act 
of 1912.92  
The main thrust of the UDF strategy was to take place in the north of GSWA. 
The advance of the Northern Army was directed at Windhoek and at the 
Schutztruppe headquarters. The most fundamental consideration in the northern 
advance was the availability of water. Botha could only move from water point to 
water point. The defensive line of Riet, Pforte and Jakkalsfontein was the first major 
tactical objective and was coincidentally a water source. Ritchie argues “Botha’s 
principle task was to take an army right across the Namib Desert and to do that he 
had to capture every water-hole and keep it.”93 
On 19 March 1915, Botha moved from Husab and then proceeded with 
staged operations to take the Riet defensive line.94 The 1st and 2nd Mounted Brigades 
were used for the attack. Husab was at a position which ran parallel to the Swakop 
River. The German position at Riet, Pforte and Jakkalsfontein extended for 48 
kilometres and was strongly defended with 2 000 troops and four artillery pieces.95 
The Langer Heindrich hills formed a natural defensive structure on the eastern bank 
of the Swakop River and were held by the Germans.96 Furthermore, the Germans 
occupied the Husabberg, Pforteberg and Geisberg hills north of the river.97 In 
response to the German’s strong defensive position, Botha stated, “I shall out 
manoeuvre them with flank movements.”98 
Botha wanted to engage and outflank the forces at Riet, Pforte and Jakkalsfontein 
simultaneously to prevent the German forces from reinforcing a particular front.99 In 
the early hours of the morning of 20 March, Brits’s scouts made contact with the 
German positions. The initial contact was followed by the South African artillery 
engaging the Germans.100 Botha was unable to envelop the German forces directly 
at Riet.101  Botha deployed Alberts to envelop the German force at Pforte, which was 
positioned to the northwest of Riet, and formed part of the German defensive line.  
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Map 4. The Battle of Riet, Pforte, Jakalswater.102  
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Alberts sent the Standerton and Ermelo commandos to engage the Germans 
directly at Pforte, and Swarts’s scouts and two other commando groupings were sent 
through the gap between Husabberg and Pforteberg who hurried through the corridor 
under German artillery fire. The movement was done in spectacular fashion and 
enabled the railway between Pforte and Jakkalswater to be cut, which isolated the 
forward German detachments.103 Alberts captured the whole force with all their 
equipment at Pforteberg.104 The German forces captured totalled 209 soldiers and 
two guns.105 The swiftness of the commandos ensured the successful capturing of 
the position.106  
Commandant Collins’s men pursued the Germans at Jakkalsfontein. However, the 
strong and direct German artillery fire on the commandos caused them to withdraw, 
leaving 43 soldiers as prisoners of war.107 The total UDF loss was 13 dead, 41 
wounded and 43 prisoners of war while the Germans reported 16 dead, 21 wounded 
and 264 prisoners of war.108 
The southern offensive 
General D McKenzie took over command of the central force at Lüderitz 
from Colonel PS Beves in October 1914. Beves was deployed with the 1st Transvaal 
Scottish Regiment, Imperial Light Horse and seven guns from the 7th Citizen Force 
Battery.109 The forces in the south were opposed by Major Ritter who had a battery 
of artillery and four mounted regiments, as well as Maritz with approximately 800 
rebels.110 The strength of McKenzie’s force on 22 December 1914 was 2 183 
mounted men and 5 754 non-mounted men.111 
 
 
Graph 1. Central Force increase in troops (including the forces in the field and 1 815 
soldiers en route in March 1915).112 
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Graph 2. Strength of the Southern Army (Central, Southern and Eastern Forces) by 
March 1915 (inclusive of the forces in the field and 5 895 soldiers en route).113 
Van Deventer’s force had a numerical strength of 6 958 on 4 April 1915 of 
whom 6 176 were mounted.114 This allowed him to cover large distances at a fast 
rate. Van Deventer took Kalkfontein on 5 April 1915. The Germans deployed in a 
strong position in the Karas Mountains outside Kalkfontein. Van Deventer executed 
a double envelopment, which induced the Germans to retreat. After a brief fight, the 
Germans withdrew to Keetmanshoop.115  
The Germans eventually evacuated Aus on their own accord. The rapid 
advance of Berrange and Van Deventer from the east and south (across 
Namaqualand and the Kalahari) respectively dissuaded the Germans from 
maintaining their defensive position at Aus.116 Aus was evacuated due to strategic 
pressure within GSWA.117  
Dane is of the opinion that the Germans were outmanoeuvred in the south of 
GSWA.118 Graph 2 shows the numerical strength of the South African forces. On 14 
April 1915, the mounted soldiers of Berrange and Van Deventer totalled 7 506.119  
The southern offensive advanced on Gibeon following the capture of Aus. 
Collyer states that the German withdrawal from Gibeon was not related to the actions 
of the UDF but it was rather the result of the overall strategic situation and the 
Union’s advance in the north of GSWA.120 
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The advance on Windhoek 
The Union forces were in dire need of logistics. The rapid movements and 
forced marches led to problems in keeping the forward troops supplied.121 Collyer 
argues that keeping the mounted soldiers mobile was the most important 
consideration as the advance on Windhoek depended on their mobility.122 Botha 
stated that his chief obstacle in the campaign was the lack of transport.123 
 
 
Graph 3. Increase in UDF logistical support.124 
Botha appealed to parliament to make funds available for mules and wagons. 
This was finally approved by the end of April. Botha thus had sufficient stores to 
provide his commandos five days of sustainment in the field. Parliament approved 
300 wagons and mules for the drive to Windhoek.125 The strength of the mounted 
unit showed an increase from 59 ammunition wagons, 110 wagons and 51 water 
carts on 1 March 1915 to 86 ammunition wagons, 376 wagons and 165 water carts 
on 12 April 1915.126  
The 1st Mounted Brigade under the command of Brits was sent to Kubas, the 
2nd Mounted Brigade under the leadership of Alberts was deployed to Potmine and 
Otjimbingwe, and Colonel JS Wylie was sent with the infantry up the railway via 
Sphinx to Kubas.127 The movements of the commandos were designed for Brits to 
engage the German forces south of Karibib whereas Myburgh would commit to a 
large sweeping envelopment between Karibib and Okahandja.128  
Karibib was taken without much resistance, and Windhoek officially 
surrendered to Botha on 12 May 1915. This included the capture of the wireless 
station, which the Germans had dissembled on their own initiative.129 The Germans 
retreated from Windhoek to Tsumeb, the location of their last wireless station. For 
six weeks from mid-May until mid-June, Botha prepared his forces and logistics for 
the final advance.130  
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Map 5. Result of the South African actions up to 3 May 1915.131  
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Map 6: Action at Otavifontein.132 
109 
The final envelopment 
The advance started on 18 June 1915.133 Earlier in the campaign, Collyer had 
become a temporary colonel and was given the appointment of assistant adjutant 
general (chief-of-staff).134 As chief-of-staff, Collyer did well to organise the 
watering of the columns as they marched. He had the water and its capacity tested 
on the routes of advance. He planned the advance in a staggered fashion that allowed 
for the different sections of the advancing columns to be watered sequentially.135 
The UDF was reasonably well supplied (by commando standards), which allowed 
for the full use of their mobility.136  
Brits took Omaruru on 19 June 1915.137 The advance moved from Omaruru 
to Kalkveld where it was thought that the Germans were planning to put up a stand. 
The Germans did not fight but withdrew northwards. Botha’s force then advanced 
to Otjiwarongo.138 Myburgh deployed from Wilhelmstal in a wide envelopment to 
take Grootfontein. Botha understood the probability that he would lose contact with 
Myburgh.139 The UDF was advancing over a front of 95 kilometres.140 Botha allowed 
Myburgh out on his own initiative as he trusted the instincts of Myburgh who in turn 
understood the intent of the commander-in-chief.141  
Manie Botha advanced towards the German position at Otavifontein while 
Lukin was deployed to the east of the Elefantenberg to stop a possible flank attack 
by the Germans.142 The Germans had 3 372 rifles with 36 guns and 22 machine guns 
at Otavifontein, which were not effectively employed against the Union’s 5th and 6th 
Mounted Brigades.143 The Germans executed a fighting withdrawal to 
Grootfontein.144 Manie Botha pushed forward through bushy and rugged terrain, 
which forced the German commander to withdraw. The German chief-of-staff stated 
that, had they had one hour more to prepare, the Germans would have destroyed the 
Union forces.145 Manie Botha ensured surprise by rushing the German position.146 
Whittal gives the figures as 10 Germans killed and 25 wounded and seven South 
African wounded and four dead in the action.147 
Myburgh departed on 18 June, and moved via Okasisse and Wilhelmstal, 
arriving at the Waterberg plateau on 26 June. On 29 June Myburgh moved to 
Otajewita and then to Omboamgomde. On 2 July 1915, he arrived at Esere. During 
the extensive marching, the troops and horses were without water for up to two 
days.148  
The South Africans received intelligence that the Germans were entrenched 
at Gaub and the right wing of the 3rd Brigade was tasked to envelop the enemy’s rear 
to the west, while the 2nd Brigade was sent to the enemy’s rear to the east.149 
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Myburgh defeated the small German force at Gaub on 2 July, and subsequently 
advanced on Tsumeb.150 The Germans in Tsumeb surrendered on 6 July 1915.151  
The Germans at Namutoni surrendered to Brits on 8 July.152 In order to 
achieve this feat Brits had to undertake an extensive and arduous march. Brits 
departed on 18 June from Karibib while Myburgh departed from Okasisse. Brits 
moved to Etanaho, Omatjenne and Otijasu where his troops eventually found potable 
water. Brits’s men took Ombika on 3 July and Okakuejo on 4 July, and on 5 July 
Rietfontein was taken. Brits’s brigade covered 563 kilometres in 13 days in the 
march to Namutoni. The German force at Namutoni subsequently surrendered.153 
Ritchie contends, “Franke was surrounded before he knew it. So neat and 
swift had been the plan of the Commander-in-Chief that the Germans was 
incredulous until his scouts kept coming in and telling him what the real state of 
affairs was.”154 The Germans were facing Botha and the infantry at Otavifontein and 
Myburgh and Brits had cut the German retreat. The final offensive against the last 
German position was made by 5 250 mounted soldiers and 4 750 riflemen with 32 
artillery weapons against approximately 5 000 German soldiers in well-defended 
positions with artillery and machine guns.155  
On 9 July 1915, the Germans accepted Botha’s offer for unconditional 
surrender.156 The German forces at Khorab included approximately 4 000 troops and 
30 guns.157 Seitz sent a letter to confirm the German surrender at 02:00 on 9 July.158 
The GSWA campaign was the first successful campaign by a dominion of the British 
Empire during the First World War.  
Analysis of the final envelopment of the German forces with regard to 
manoeuvre warfare theory 
The reasons for defeat and victory are complex and they are by their nature 
inextricably intertwined. In order for one to determine the cause of victory, it is also 
equally important to understand the reason for the defeat of a given military force. 
As mentioned, Gooch and Cohen have created a taxonomy for defeat in which the 
first step is to determine the cause of the military failure or defeat. This step is 
followed by determining the critical tasks, which led to the defeat, and the third step 
is to do a layered analysis of the organisational aspects, which led to the failure.159  
The cause of defeat for the Germans was not that they were outnumbered, 
but rather that they did not put up a defensive battle. The German force surrendered 
with their entire fighting force intact. The Germans surrendered with 4 740 soldiers, 
37 artillery pieces and 22 machine guns and substantial amounts of ammunition, 
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which had been stockpiled.160 The German and Union forces never engaged in a 
sustained pitched battle at tactical level at the end of the campaign.  
Several critical tasks were left incomplete by the German forces during the 
final envelopments. The German forces could have, and with hindsight should have, 
offered battle at Kalkveld and at Otavifontein. The German position at Kalkveld was 
vacated by the German forces without offering battle. 
According to Botha, the German forces at Kalkveld withdrew because they 
feared that they would be surrounded by the UDF. Botha alluded to the fact that the 
terrain and the circumstances did not allow for an encirclement of the German 
position at Kalkveld.161 The position at Otavifontein was critical to the UDF’s route 
of advance as it held an important water source. Botha mentioned that, if the UDF 
had not been able to have captured Otavifontein, the Union forces would have been 
compelled to retreat and regroup.162  
Franke had opted for a defensive strategy where he had conserved his forces 
to give battle at the critical time and place.163 Franke had written a letter to his forces, 
which was of an antagonistic tone and spoke of an imminent colossal clash between 
the German and Union forces. Botha stated that, despite the aggressive tone of 
Franke’s letter and the fact that physically the German force was largely intact, it 
was evident that the German morale was shaken.164 The German retreat from 
Otavifontein was a clear indication that their morale had collapsed.165 
Gooch and Handel state that once the critical failures have been analysed 
they should be compared to the different levels of organisation. The German failure 
to give battle at the required times at Otavifontein and Kalkveld was the result of the 
shaken morale of the German subordinate commanders. The German force was 
never previously engaged in the type of campaign which they encountered.  
The Union force’s mobility was something novel and the Germans found 
themselves retreating on a continuous basis. The German military were not familiar 
with facing a rapid, highly mobile enemy, which targeted their logistical and 
communication lines. The Germans were at this stage accustomed to trade space for 
time, and retreat became an operational procedure. The constant withdrawal of the 
German forces resulted in the forces becoming more and more disconnected to the 
prospect of an actual pitched defensive battle. The leadership of Franke and his 
subordinate commanders in this regard must be questioned. Furthermore, it should 
be questioned whether the German force was more acquainted, familiar and 
comfortable with offensive warfare as opposed to a defensive campaign.166 Captain 
HO Von Kleist and Ritter were perhaps overwhelmed by the magnitude of their 
commands and their responsibilities in the final phase of the campaign. 
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The Germans appear to have accepted defeat long before the final surrender 
to the UDF. The tacit understanding of German sections and detachments to retreat 
may have become an organisational norm, which led to the final surrender. Figure 1 
represents the equation that was applied to the German and Union forces in the 
analysis of the final envelopment in GSWA. In terms of the formula, the number of 
the Union forces was considerably higher than that of the German forces. The 
materiel quality of the equipment of the German and Union forces was 
approximately equal. As the campaign progressed, the UDF controlled the railway, 
which allowed for the logistical provisioning of the Union forces. The non-materiel 
quality, which refers to morale, motivation, offensive spirit and leadership, was 
higher for the UDF than for the German force. 
The results of the formula show that the Union forces were stronger than the 
German forces in numbers, materiel quality (with the control of the railway) and 
non-materiel quality. On the point of numerical superiority, the Union did not have 
overwhelmingly stronger numbers than the Germans during the final envelopments. 
Botha stated that the knowledge of the location of the enemy forces made it feasible 
to take the required number of troops and no more.167 
During the last phase of the campaign and the UDF’s final envelopments, 
the Germans were on interior lines. The German force was in the central position 
and they were able to concentrate superior forces on any of the separate Union forces 
that were deployed in a forward position.168 Hence, the numerical superiority of the 
Union’s forces was not the most decisive factor during the final envelopments. 
What was significant about the South African campaign in GSWA was the 
brevity of the campaign. Handel states that qualitative factors are usually the most 
decisive factors in a short war.169 In this case, this refers to the offensive spirit 
leadership and morale of the UDF. Handel also claims that quantitative superiority 
normally becomes important in extended campaigns.170 The briefness of the 
campaign in GSWA is thus testament to the strength of the qualitative factors of the 
UDF. The importance of numerical superiority is in no way undermined; however, 
the cause of victory for the South Africans and the cause of defeat for the Germans 
were not direct results of numerical strength. Had the Germans repulsed the Union 
forces during the final envelopments, the length of the campaign would have become 
protracted. In that case, it would be understandable that the UDF’s superior numbers 
would eventually have influenced the termination of the campaign.  
Seitz in official correspondence with the Kaiser stated that the German defeat 
was caused by the superior numbers of the UDF, which had encircled them at Khorab 
by taking the surrounding German positions at Namutoni and Tsumeb. Seitz further 
claimed that every attempt to break through the Union encirclement was futile.171  
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Botha gave the reason for the Union victory as the effect of surprise on the 
German force, which was caused by the rapidity of the enveloping attacks on the 
German positions at Tsumeb and Namutoni.172 The collapse of the German force’s 
morale was central to the loss. The numerical superiority of the Union was an 
important factor but can be regarded as a simple explanation to the complex 
phenomenon of military failure and defeat. 
The significance of the campaign is related to its brevity. This article links 
the briefness of the campaign to the qualitative factors of the UDF, which in turn 
was analysed with manoeuvre warfare theory. The final envelopments resulted in the 
dislocation of the physical and psychological dimensions of the German 
commanders. The low morale and lack of offensive spirit and cohesion of the 
German force resulted in their surrender without having been physically harmed. 
The surrendering of a military force without physical resistance indicates that they 
were compelled to do so by psychological pressure and the perceived threat of death 
or destruction. 
  From To 
Distance 
(km) 
Time 
(hours) 
Northern 
Army 
Left wing 2nd 
Mounted 
Brigade Husab 
Jakkalswater 
(and back) 122 22 
Northern 
Army 
5th Mounted 
Brigade Okaputa Kilo 500 70 18 
Northern 
Army 
6th Mounted 
Brigade Omarassa Elefantsnek 58 15 
Northern 
Army 
3rd and 5th 
Mounted 
Brigades Riet Otjimbingue 112 37 
Central 
Force 
7th, 8th and 9th 
Mounted 
Brigades Berseba Gibeon 112 72 
Southern 
Force 
Van 
Deventer’s 
column Neu Khais  Kabus 193 144 
Table 1. Best forced marches.173 
Analysis of the German South West African campaign and manoeuvre warfare 
theory 
The campaign in GSWA was characterised by swift advances followed by 
operational pauses, which were used to consolidate the space covered. The South 
African forces in the north paused from 20 March until the end of April 1915 so as 
to get the necessary supplies. During the operational pause in the north, the offensive 
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in the south continued. Kalkfontein and Gibeon were taken in April 1915. This 
demonstrates operations on different lines of advance. The UDF was in the field for 
133 days and they were on the move for 24 days.174 The 24 days in which the forces 
were executing operational movements was accompanied by 109 days of operational 
pause. The German military centre of gravity in GSWA was not the capital but their 
military command and operational headquarters. A specific operational or strategic 
headquarters is a typical centre of gravity.175 Leonhard argues, “operational planners 
must determine how to use the available combat power to achieve the goals of a 
campaign”.176 Botha made efficient use of the commandos and mounted infantry 
with their high mobility and the infantry with their ability to take and hold ground. 
The extraordinary and ordinary forces, as mentioned by Sun Tzu, indicate a highly 
mobile force to execute envelopments and an ordinary force to take and hold 
ground.177 Botha understood the importance of mobility and surprise as the most 
important considerations on the tactical and strategic level.178 Botha’s emphasis on 
mobility was vividly demonstrated by the UDF return in strength in December 1914 
indicating 33 308 mounted soldiers.179  
Conclusion 
Liddel Hart argues that the psychological and physical dislocation of the 
enemy on a continuous basis requires the advancing force to change its lines of 
operations through divergent advances on a central objective or through divergent 
advances on successive decisive points on route to the centre of gravity.180 This was 
the case in GSWA where the UDF had a northern and southern offensive, which 
were directed at the German operational headquarters as the centre of gravity.  
Manoeuvre theory holds that mobility is more important than firepower.181 
Certain elements of the opposing force have to be destroyed following which the 
eventual positioning of forces will induce defeat with the threat of annihilation.182 
The numerical superiority of the UDF facilitated the taking and holding of ground. 
The lines of communication were secured by the infantry who manned the 
blockhouses. The number of commandos allowed the Union forces to pursue 
different lines of advance; therefore, the importance of numbers cannot be 
underestimated. However, the deciding factor in the operational and strategic success 
points towards manoeuvre theory and Botha’s innate understanding of its attributes.  
The mobility of the commandos ensured tactical and operational surprise 
resulting in quick, decisive outcomes. Reflecting on Botha’s military background, 
Whittal argues, “his elastic military training allowed for the accomplishment of the 
campaign”.183 The operation was designed as a quick, decisive campaign of 
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manoeuvre.184 The campaign in GSWA provides an ideal case study for manoeuvre 
warfare theory.  
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